Friday, February 27, 2009

VEDANTASARA - IV. DE-SUPERIMPOSITION:




IV. DE-SUPERIMPOSITION:

137. As a snake falsely perceived in a rope is ultimately found out to be nothing but the rope; similarly the world of unreal things, beginning with ignorance, superimposed upon the Reality, is realized, at the end, to be nothing but Brahman. This is known as de-superimposition (Apavada).

138. Thus it has been said: Vikara is the actual modification of a thing altering into another substance; while vivarta is only an apparent modification.

139. To illustrate: The four kinds of physical bodies which are the seats of enjoyment; the different kinds of food and drink etc., which are the objects of enjoyment; the fourteen planes such as Bhur etc., which contain them and the universe (Brahmanda) which contains these planes -- all these are reduced to their cause, the five gross elements.

140. These five gross elements, together with the five objects such as sound etc., and the subtle bodies – all these are reduced to their cause – the uncompounded elements.

141. The five uncompounded elements, together with the tendencies of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, in the reverse order to that of creation, are reduced to their cause, namely Consciousness associated with ignorance.

142. This ignorance and the Consciousness associated with it, such as Isvara etc., are resolved into the transcendent Brahman unassociated with ignorance, which is the substratum of them all.

143. By this process of superimposition and de-superimposition the precise significance of “That” and “Thou” is clearly determined.

144. To explain: Collective ignorance and the rest, Consciousness associated with it and endowed with omniscience etc., as also the Pure Consciousness unassociated with any attribute – these three, when appearing as one and inseparable like a red-hot iron ball, become the primary meaning of the word “That”.

145. The unassociated Consciousness which is the substratum of the limiting adjuncts and of Isvara which they limit, is the implied meaning of “That”.

146. Individual ignorance and the rest, Consciousness associated with it and endowed with partial knowledge etc., as also the Pure Consciousness unassociated with any attribute – these three when appearing as one and inseparable like a red-hot iron ball, become the primary meaning of the word “Thou”.

147. The unassociated transcendent Consciousness – the inward Bliss - which is the substratum of the limiting adjuncts and of the Jiva which they limit, is the implied meaning of the word “Thou”.

148. Now is being described the meaning of the great Vedic dictum (Mahavakyam): This dictum is a proposition conveying identity, by virtue of the three relations of its terms, viz., “Thou art That”.

149. The three relations are: Samanadhakaranya or the relation between two words having the same substratum, Visesana-visesyabhava or the relation between the imports of two words qualifying each other (so as to signify a common object); and Laksya-laksana-bhava or the relation between two words and an identical thing implied by them, here, the Inner Self.

150. Compare – (The relations are:) The relation between two words having the same substratum; that between two words qualifying each other (so as to signify a common object), and the relation between two words and an identical thing implied by them (here the Inner self).

151. Samanadhikaranya is the relationship between two words having the same locus. For instance, in the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, the word “That” signifying Devadatta associated with the past, and the word “This” signifying Devadatta associated with the present, both refer to one and the same person called Devadatta. Similarly in the sentence, “Thou art That”, the word “That” signifying Consciousness characterized by remoteness etc., and the word “Thou” signifying Consciousness characterized by immediacy etc., both refer to one and the same Consciousness, viz., Brahman.

152. The second relation, that of Visesana-visesya-bhava is this: In the same sentence (“This is that Devadatta”), the meaning of the word “That” is Devadatta existing in the past and the meaning of the word “This” is Devadatta existing in the present. They are contrary ideas, but still they qualify each other so as to signify a common object. Similarly in the sentence, “Thou art That”, the meaning of the word “That” is Consciousness characterized by remoteness etc., and the meaning of the word “Thou” is Consciousness characterized by immediacy etc., They are contrary ideas but still they qualify each other so as to signify a common object.

153. The third relation, that of Laksyalaksanabhava is this: In that very sentence (“This is that Devadatta”), the words “This” and “That” or their meanings, by the elimination of contrary associations of past and present time, stand in the relation of implier and implied with Devadatta who is common to both. Similarly in this sentence (“Thou art That”) also, the words “That” and “Thou”, or their meanings, by the elimination of contrary associations of remoteness and immediacy etc., stand in the relation of implier and implied with Consciousness which is common to both.

154. This is also called Bhagalaksana.

155. The literal meaning in the manner of the sentence, “The blue Lotus” does not fit in with the sentence: “Thou art That”.

156. In the phrase (“The blue lotus”), the meaning of the word “blue” is the blue colour, and the meaning of the word “lotus” is the flower called lotus. They respectively exclude other colours such as white etc., and other objects such as cloth etc., Thus these two words mutually stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified. And this relation means their mutual qualification or their unity. This interpretation of the sentence, since it does not contradict any other means of knowledge, is admissible.

157. But in this sentence (“Thou art That”), the meaning of the word “That” is Consciousness associated with remoteness etc., and the meaning of the word “Thou” is Consciousness associated with immediacy etc., If it is maintained that these two ideas, since they eliminate their mutual distinction stand to each other in the relation of qualifier and qualified, meaning their mutual qualification or their unity, it involves a contradiction with direct perception and other means of knowledge, and therefore is inconsistent.

158. Therefore it has been said: “In this sentence (“Thou art That”), the correct meaning is neither the union of the two ideas nor their mutual qualification. The real meaning of the sentence, according to scholars, is an absolute homogeneous principle.” (Panchadasi VII-75).

159. Again in the sentence (“Thou art That”), Jahallakshana is not also admissible as in the sentence, “The cowherd village is on (literally in) the Ganga.”

160. In that sentence, as it is altogether absurd to construe the words, “Ganga” and “cowherd-village”, literally, in the sense of container and contained respectively, that meaning of the sentence must be entirely abandoned, and it should refer by implication to the bank of the Ganga. Hence in this case the application of Jahallakshana is admissible.

161. But this sentence (“Thou art That”) meaning the identity of Consciousness characterized by immediacy or remoteness involves contradiction in one part only. Therefore it is not proper to abandon the other part as well and indicate something else by implication (Lakshana). Hence in this case Jahallakshana is not admissible.

162. Nor can it be urged: Just as the word “Ganga” (in the sentence in question), gives up its direct meaning and implies the “bank”, so may the words “That” and “Thou” (in the sentence, “Thou art That”) give up their direct meaning and mean by implication the contents of “Thou” and “That” respectively. So why should it not be a case of Jahallakshana ?

163. In that sentence the word “bank” is not mentioned, and therefore the meaning, which is not explicit, can only be derived through implication (Lakshana). But in the other sentence (“Thou art That”), the words “That” and “Thou” are mentioned and their meanings are explicit; therefore it is not proper to use a Lakshana here in order to indicate through either of them the sense of the other (Thou or That).

164. Nor is Ajahallakshana applicable in this sentence as in the sentence, “The red colour is running.”

165. The literal meaning of that sentence, namely, the running of red colour, is absurd. This absurdity can be removed without abandoning the meaning of the word “Red” by interpreting it to imply a horse of that colour. Therefore in this case Ajahallakshana is admissible.

166. But here (in the sentence, “Thou art That”) the literal meaning, conveying an identical Consciousness associated with remoteness, immediacy, etc., is self-contradictory. If, without abandoning this meaning, any other idea connected with it be implied, still the contradiction will not be reconciled. Therefore, in this case Ajahallakshana is inadmissible.

167. Nor can it be urged: Either of the words “That” or “Thou” may exclude that portion of its meaning which conflicts with the other word and imply a combination of the other portion with the meaning of the other word (Thou art That). Therefore no necessity arises of admitting Bhagalakshana.

168. Because it is impossible to conceive the same word as indicating a part of its own meaning as well as the meaning of another word. Moreover, when the meaning is directly expressed by the other word, it does not require the application of Lakshana to the first word to indicate it.

169. Therefore, as the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, or its meaning, on account of the contradictions involved in one part of their import, viz., Devadatta as existing in the past and in the present, implies, by abandoning the conflicting portion which has reference to time, only the non-conflicting portion, viz., the man Devadatta – similarly, the sentence, “Thou art That”, or its meaning, on account of the contradictions involved in one part of their import, viz., Consciousness characterized by remoteness and immediacy, implies, by abandoning the conflicting portion which has relation to remoteness, immediacy etc., only Absolute Pure Consciousness which is common to both “Thou” and “That”.

170. Now is being described the meaning of the sentence, “I am Brahman” (Br. Up. I-4-10), expressive of intuitive experience.

171. When the teacher in this way clears the meaning of the words “That” and “Thou” by the removal of superimpositions, and makes the qualified student grasp the import of the sentence, “Thou art That”, which is Absolute Unity, there arises in his mind a state of Absolute Oneness in which he feels that he is Brahman, by nature eternal, pure, self-illumined, free, real, supremely blissful, infinite and one without a second.

172. That mental state, illumined by the reflection of Pure Consciousness, objectifies the Supreme Brahman, unknown but identical with the individual self and destroys the ignorance pertaining to Brahman. Then just as a cloth is burnt when the threads composing it are burnt, so all the effects of ignorance are destroyed when their cause, viz., ignorance, is destroyed. Hence the mental state of Absolute Oneness, which forms part of those effects, is also destroyed.

173. As the light of a lamp cannot illumine the lustre of the sun but is overpowered by it, so Consciousness reflected in that state of the mind is unable to illumine the Supreme Brahman, self-effulgent and identical with the individual self, and is overpowered by it. And on the destruction of this state of Absolute Oneness with which that Consciousness is associated there remains only the Supreme Brahman, identical with the individual self, just as the image of a face in a looking-glass is resolved into the face itself when the looking-glass is removed.

174. Such being the case, there is no contradiction between the following Sruti passages: “By the mind alone It is to be perceived” (Br. Up. IV-4-19), and “That which cannot be thought of by the mind” (Kena Up. I-5). We are to suppose that the unknown Brahman is brought into contact with only the mental state, but not with the underlying Consciousness.

175. Thus it has been said: “The authors of the scriptures have refuted the idea that the individual Consciousness can manifest the Brahman. But they admit that the Brahman associated with ignorance is brought into contact with the mental states only for the purpose of dispelling ignorance regarding It” (Panchadasi VI-90).

176. And: “Brahman, being self-luminous, does not depend on the individual Consciousness for Its illumination” Panchadasi VI-92).

177. But there is a difference when the mental state assumes the form of material objects.

178. Because, in the case of the experience, “This is a jar”, the mental state assumes the form of the jar, makes the unknown jar its object and dispels the ignorance regarding it. Then the Consciousness underlying the mental state manifests the material jar.

179. Thus it has been said: “Both the intellect and the Consciousness underlying it come into contact with the jar. The intellect destroys the ignorance (regarding the jar) and the underlying Consciousness manifests the jar” (Panchadasi VII-91).

180. Just as the light of a lamp coming into contact with a jar or cloth existing in darkness, dispels the darkness which envelops them and through its own lustre manifests them as well.

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